CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

77-79 Cross Street, Sale

Development of 57 Apartments & 2 Houses

for: Urban Heritage Developments

version A: 17th April 2018

URN: 2018/0221/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

77-79 Cross Street, Sale, M33 7AN

2018/0221/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- *Boundary Treatments / Site enclosure*
- *Access controls / lobby entrance*

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

[redacted]

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

Contents

Appendix

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site, shown red on the plan, is on the northwest edge of Sale town centre, about 300m from the main retail area along School Road. The immediate neighbourhood contains a mix of residential and commercial properties.

The A56 Cross Street passes the eastern side of the site – this is a major route linking central Manchester, the quays & M60 to south western suburbs. And it is busy throughout the day. Park Avenue is relatively quiet and serves residential properties, but is frequently used by traffic avoiding traffic lights. The junction of Atkinson Rd. and Cross St. is controlled by traffic lights and queuing traffic backs up past the site at peak times.

A short parade of shops adjoins the south eastern boundary of the site, containing a hot food takeaway (open late) with a bus stop & shelter nearby. The rear service area is openly accessible off Atkinson Road. There is also a public house and other commercial property close to the site.

Currently the site is occupied by the office building and car park, with vehicular access off Park Avenue and Atkinson Road. An emergency access point links to the garage court behind flats on York Avenue.


Park Avenue frontage


Emergency access point to garage court, York Avenue


Access to site off Atkinson Road


Boundary with shops on Cross St.


Shops / takeaway, bus stop & shelter on Cross Street


Junction of Cross Street and Park Avenue


Entrance to existing office building, Park Avenue

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2017 to 28th February 2018

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
22	11	55	237	61	13	<5	20	15	44

2.1.1 The level of most volume crime in this area is relatively high for Trafford borough, although it is generally about average for Greater Manchester, with the exception of less serious wounding and bicycle theft. Less serious wounding offences are concentrated in the centre of Sale along the B5166 / School Road, particularly where it intersects with Tatton Road and Springfield Road. The higher rate of less serious wounding offences in these areas is most likely due to the licenced premises and density of population. Bicycle thefts are similarly concentrated in the centre of Sale, with a smaller concentration at leisure facilities on Washway Road.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Exploitation of insecure doors, particularly at the rear of the premises, to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard (see section 4.1) and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is not acceptable for postal / delivery personnel to have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided. Secure fencing and gates must separate the accessible frontage from private back gardens.

2.2.2 Opening of secured doors, in particular rear doors and rear patio doors, by breaking glass panes using large objects such as stones or bricks.

Possible Solution - All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Secure boundary treatments should be provided to prevent unauthorised access to vulnerable windows. All ground floor / accessible windows, including folding / sliding patio doors should certified to recognised security standards, and be fitted with locks and opening restrictors to prevent offenders from reaching in to steal items or gaining unauthorised access.

2.2.3 The majority of vehicle crimes target vehicles parked on the streets, with car parks and driveways being targeted less.

Possible Solution – Communal parking areas should be well-defined with obvious enclosure, and entrance points should be limited to one well-overlooked location within a secure boundary. Parked vehicles should be capable of being overlooked from routinely-occupied rooms within the apartment block. The car parking areas should benefit from effective illumination. The layout of the development should be designed at accommodate the likely demand for car parking space in order to cater for residents and their visitors within the site. Parking for houses should be contained within the defined boundary of the properties.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Trafford and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.

Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than Trafford as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than Trafford as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than Trafford as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than Trafford as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is highest on Fridays and Sundays.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. Offenders who select the early hours of the morning to commit burglary are most likely to be doing so because the area will be quiet and the low level of light will reduce the likelihood of offenders being witnessed entering properties.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In the local area the following points of entry and MO's have occurred most frequently:

- Exploitation of insecure doors, particularly at the rear of the property, to gain entry to the property. It is likely that offenders in these cases are selecting rear doors opportunistically because they are more likely to be left insecure than the front door.
- Opening of secured doors, in particularly rear doors and rear patio doors, by breaking glass panes using large objects such as stones or bricks. It is likely that offenders in these cases are selecting rear doors as they are less likely to be witnessed entering the property.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is high throughout the week and is highest on Sundays.

Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is high throughout the day except for the late morning, with a slightly higher rate at night. It is likely that the mix of residential, commercial and leisure / social sites in the area presents a greater opportunity throughout the day for offenders to commit vehicle crime. The most likely reason for the rate of vehicle crime being slightly higher at night is because vehicle owners will be unable to observe their vehicle, reducing the likelihood of offenders being witnessed or interrupted.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises conversion and extension of the existing office building to create a block of 57 apartments with accommodation over five levels, including 5 town houses, plus 2 new-build semi-detached houses facing Atkinson Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 Many of the flats will have routinely-occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent communal and public areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of areas around the block. Landscaping must not obstruct views over the parking areas or entrances.

3.2.2 The internal areas of the blocks appears to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings.

3.2.3 The two houses will be orientated to face Atkinson Road. Houses should have windows of routinely-occupied rooms to their front elevations (at ground floor level) which helps to maximise informal surveillance opportunities.

3.2.4 The principal entrance to the houses is located in the front elevation and is clearly apparent on approaching the dwellings.

3.2.5 Cycle parking for residents of the apartments is located within an enclosure within the building. Entry to the cycle store should be access-controlled and restricted to genuine cyclists only (overseen by building managers). Cycle stands should enable bikes to be secured by the frame and both wheels. Any cycle parking stands for visitors should be well overlooked from inside the block.

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can

increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Doors to individual apartments should be positioned flush with the corridor walls. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines.

3.3.2 The town houses should not contain internal connections to the block, which could otherwise compromise the overall security of the communal space / corridors.

3.3.3 Enclosure of site / automatic gates for car park. The security of the communal parking area and features within it would be greatly enhanced with the inclusion of access-controlled, automated, entry gates to the car park. Such gates should be located as close as possible to the back of pavement and be activated by a fob, only available to residents.

3.3.4 Review of boundaries. Secure boundary treatments should be a minimum of 2.1m high. In places where the existing boundary treatment is required to provide an effective and secure barrier around the site, the condition of the fencing and walling should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust walling or fencing system. Particular attention should be given to detailing wall / railing combinations, and the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature which could compromise the integrity of the site boundary, and possibly require retrofitting of unsightly security toppings.

3.3.5 The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.3.6 Lobby entrance arrangement. Internally, a secure lobby arrangement should be introduced at the entrance(s) to the block in order to reduce potential tailgating opportunities. This would require additional, access-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised entry to the stairs and residential corridors. Apartments should not be directly accessed off the lobby. Postal / identity theft is a significant problem within apartment blocks and if the mail boxes are to be located within the building itself they should be situated within the secure lobby area so that postal delivery staff do not have access to the whole of the building, or ideally a “through-the- wall” arrangement should be adopted, allowing external deliveries and internal collection of mail.

3.3.7 Balconies and external elevations generally. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.

3.3.8 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.3.9 Houses & Apartments – The site frontage should be effectively defined and enclosed, making a clear distinction between the public realm and private / communal space around the properties. Proposed boundary treatments should not provide features that may create informal sitting / gathering areas or climbing aids.

3.3.10 Houses - Front and rear garden areas should be separated using 1.8m high fencing and / or gates, preferably aligned with the front of the property.

3.3.11 Houses - Space should be identified within the enclosed rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.

3.3.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises extension and modification of an existing building, and thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade its physical security is to some extent constrained by the existing structure. The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development. The integrity of the ground floor doors and windows should be assessed to ensure that they confirm to these standards. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors (Apartment Block)

- ❑ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

- ❑ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.

- ❑ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

- ❑ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

- ❑ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

- ❑ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621 / 8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

- ❑ Internal doors / frames to the cycle and refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electronic lock controlled by resident key-fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

- ❑ External escape-only doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Doors (Houses)

- ❑ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.

- ❑ French / double doors and folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

- ❑ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ❑ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ❑ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ❑ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.3 Windows

- ❑ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ❑ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ❑ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ❑ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Access Control

- ❑ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Residential communal entrance doors
  - Bin stores
  - Cycle stores
  - Doors from car park into block
  - Car park entrance gates / shutters

4.7 Boundaries

- ❑ Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls/railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ❑ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the rear parking area must be certified to one of the following standards:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
  - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2

- Sold Secure Gold
- PAS 68: 2013

4.8 Landscaping

- ❑ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ❑ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ❑ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ❑ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Lighting

- ❑ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ❑ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ❑ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ❑ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 CCTV

- ❑ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ❑ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ❑ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ❑ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ❑ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ❑ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- ❑ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ❑ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, stairs, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

4.11 Other

- ❑ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable. Readable meter housings for the houses should be located on the front elevation of the property.

- ❑ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

- ❑ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

- ❑ Mail boxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).

- ❑ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.

5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting is not impaired.

5.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

5.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
13/03/2018	AEW Architects	CIS instruction received
16/03/2018	AEW Architects	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
21/03/2018	N/A	Site visit
28/03/2018	Urban Heritage Developments	Confirmation of payment
17/04/2018	AEW Architects	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
03	Existing Third Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0011	Proposed Third Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0005	Existing Second Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0003	Existing Ground Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0010	Proposed Second Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0001	Location Plan	13/12/17	
0002	Existing Site Plan	13/12/17	
	3D Drawings		
0008	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0004	Existing First Floor Plan	13/12/17	
0007	Proposed Site Plan	13/12/17	
0009	Proposed First Floor Plan	13/12/17	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk